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The current economic understanding of the standard theory of cooperative organization is inclined towards neoclassical rational 
choice theory. While this is useful in predicting the behavior of individual under perfect information and less uncertain world, 
empirical evidence shows that, more often, decision-makers operate in a complex and uncertain environment, and the 
information available is far from perfect. This paper points out the existing limitations of the standard theory of cooperatives. It 
then proposes the behavioral rational choice model, which incorporates behavioral aspects into the standard neoclassical 
model. It concludes that this proposed model improves our insights and understanding of the behavior of cooperative 
organizations.
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“It has long appeared to many people that economics is the most successful of the social sciences. It has assumed that 
people are motivated by money and by the possibility of making a profit, and this has allowed it to construct formal, and 
often predictive, models of human behavior. This apparent success has led many other social scientists to cast envious 
eyes in its direction. They have thought that if they could only follow the methods of economics they could achieve 
similar successes in their own studies. These sociologists and political scientists have tried to build theories around the 
idea that all action is fundamentally 'rational' in character and that people calculate the likely costs and benefits of any 
action before deciding what to do. This approach to theory is known as rational choice theory.” (Scott, 2000: pp.2)
1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperative organizations can be traced back to the 1700s, with a more formal and structured 
cooperative emerging in 1844 under the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in England (Ortmann and King, 2007). A 
new wave of cooperative movement and cooperative organization arose during 19th century in North America and other 
parts of the world. Since then, agricultural marketing cooperatives have played a dominant role, with the evolution of 
these rooted in the emergence of commercial agriculture during 19th century. Different schools of thought on cooperative 
organization were developed in North America and Europe. The American school of thought is more inclined towards 
pragmatism, in contrast to the European school that emerged as a result of social reforms and associated philosophies of 
the times (Torgerson, Reynolds & Gray, 1997). 
In terms of methodological development, intellectual work in the field of cooperatives is fairly young, with most of 
the progress concentrated in the second half of the 20th century (Emilianoff, 1942; Robtka, 1947; Philips 1953; and 
Helmberger & Hoos; 1962). Among the early work, Helmberger’s and Hoos’s (1962) paper was regarded as seminal in 
the theory of cooperatives (Staaz, 1984). These authors used neoclassical theory of the firm to develop both short run 
and long run model of cooperatives. More specifically, marginal analysis was applied to analyze the cooperative‘s 
objective which is to maximize the benefits to members (Ortamann and King, 2007). A series of subsequent theoretical 
studies have been conducted in the last three decades to extend Helmberger’s theory and one of the different 
approaches includes the coalition and contract nexus approach to cooperative theory (Cook et al, 2004; and Staatz, 
1984).
Most of the work to date on the standard theory of cooperatives is anchored in the neoclassical theory of rational 
choice as an analytical framework. While such a framework is widely used in economic modeling, recent empirical 
evidence from behavioral science shows that actual choice behavior usually departs widely from the behaviors predicted 
by the axioms of perfect rationality (Simon, 1994; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; and Simon, 1955). Despite the 
growing literature in the field of behavioral economics, none of the studies on the theory of cooperative behavior explicitly 
included behavioral aspects into the modeling framework that was used. Thus, the objective of this essay is to revisit the 
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standard theory of cooperative organizations, highlighting the existing gap(s) and proposing possible 
improvement(s)/extension(s) based on the behavioral economics approach. The changes suggested contribute to 
advancing our understanding of how to model the actual behavior of the actors in the cooperatives context and improving 
our descriptive and predictive results about the behavior of cooperative organizations. These results are particularly 
important for management and policy makers, who are required to understand the possible outcomes and ramifications of 
their decisions. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the standard theory of cooperatives 
and an overview of behavioral economics; Section 3 presents rational choice theory. Section 4 presents fundamental 
assumptions underlying the standard theory of cooperatives, discusses its limitations and proposes a possible change, 
namely extension of the model. Section 5 presents the summary and concluding remarks.
2. Standard Theory of Cooperative
Cooperatives are organizations whose members are both owners and users of the organizational services and whose 
main objective is to maximize members’ welfare. In contrast, in standard investors owned firms (IOFs), the owners are 
not necessarily the users of the services provided and seek to maximize profit. Such uniqueness in the characteristics of 
cooperatives implies that the standard theory of the firm, which was mainly developed to understand the behaviors of 
IOFs, does not precisely capture the behavior of cooperatives, at least in its original version. In response to such 
limitations, different theoreticians have proposed diverse extensions of the neoclassical theory of the firm to explain the 
behaviors of cooperative organizations. There are several versions of cooperative theory that base their analytical 
framework on the neoclassical rational choice theory. However, the majority of these theories can be generally 
categorized into three major groups, namely: (i) the cooperative as a firm; (ii) the cooperative as a coalition; and (iii) the
cooperative as a nexus of contracts (Cook et al, 2004).
Theoretical work on cooperatives as firms assumes that a cooperative is a separate firm trying to maximize a 
single objective function. This objective function may be members’ welfare, joint profit or both, depending on the nature 
and member composition of the cooperative. Many empirical and theoretical works in this cluster have been conducted to 
address different problems arising in cooperative organizations. Such work includes spatial pricing modeling to take into 
account the effect of member heterogeneity, and mixed duopoly between cooperatives and IOFs to understand the 
justification put forward for favorable public policy towards cooperatives (Sexton; 1990; and Tennback, 1995). A detailed 
compilation of the existing studies on this category is available in Cook et al, (2004). All of the studies in this school of 
thought have used a standard neoclassical rational choice theory as a building block in their analytical framework. While 
such a framework is widely used in economic modeling, this paper will demonstrate its limitation and propose an 
alternative approach to modeling the cooperative organization.
Another group of theoreticians and modelers has applied game theory to view cooperatives as a coalition of utility-
maximizing subgroups. Based on this approach, cooperatives seek to maximize benefits (gains) from a joint action by a 
potential coalition of members. This is achieved through bargaining among members about how benefits are distributed 
(Cook et al, 2004; Zusman & Rausser, 1994; Bourgeon & Chamber, 1999; Fulton & Giannakas, 2000). Similar to the 
approach used by the first group of modelers, this approach also assumes that the behaviors of cooperatives follow the 
neoclassical rational choice model. 
There is also another group of theoreticians who view cooperatives as a nexus of contracts. This approach views 
business relationships among stakeholders as contractual relationships. It is basically a loose connection of agency 
theory, transaction cost economics and property right–incomplete contract theory. A detailed discussion of this approach 
can be accessed through different authors’ works (for example, Eilers and Hanf, 1999; and Hendrikse and Veerman, 
2001). As with the other two categories, the theoretical framework in this subcategory is built on the neoclassical rational 
choice model. The next section introduces neoclassical rational choice theory and its limitations.
3. Rational Choice Theory, Behavioral Economics and the Standard Theory of Cooperatives
The rational choice theory posits that economic actors are rational and are seeking to maximize their utilities or benefits 
(Green, 2002). From this perspective, behavior is expected to conform to the following axioms: an agent/individual faces 
a known set of alternative choices; the individual’s choices are complete; preferences are transitive and, given different 
options, the individual will choose the most preferred alternative (Green, 2002). Thus, in economics, rational behavior 
implies a behavior that is in accordance with the above axioms.
As explained in Section 2, the standard theory of cooperative organizations uses rational choice theory to explain 
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the behavior of cooperative organizations. Within the rational choice framework, individuals are assumed to have certain 
preferences and face constraints. However, empirical evidence shows that the actual choice behavior usually departs 
widely from the behaviors predicted by the axioms of perfect rationality (Simon, 1994; and Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982). Moreover, decision-makers within organizations and business firms are highly concerned with the 
discovery of choice alternatives and frequently seek satisfactory rather than optimal choices, in contrast to optimal choice 
being used in neoclassical theory (Simon, 1955; Jone, 1999; and Cyert and March, 1963). Furthermore, the standard 
neoclassical utility function focuses more on pecuniary benefits as an instrument for influencing human behaviors. Recent 
studies have shown that non-pecuniary benefits, such as identity, issue framing, endowment effects, altruism, norms and 
reciprocity also play an important role in influencing human behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000 and 2005; Ostrom, 2000; 
and Chao, 2007).
Gino and Pisano (2007) argue that, by most measures, the rational choice model can be applied successfully to 
choice problems without uncertainty. The caveat behind the real world behavioral context is that decision-making 
environments are complex; there is plenty of uncertainty; the information available is always far from being perfect and 
these environments are values-driven. Decision-makers are always faced with cognitive limitations and the inter-
dependence among these factors is important for final behavioral and decision outcome (Fischer, 2003; Stone, 1997; 
Simon, 1997; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; and Functowics, 2002). 
Moreover, empirical research findings from behavioral economists have demonstrated that the rational choice 
model systematically predicts behavior less well in specific circumstances (Gion and Pisano, 2007). For example, 
Kehneman and Tversky (1984) demonstrated that the way in which a choice is framed strongly affects the choice 
outcome that results. In contrast to traditional economics, behavioral economics does not assume “that individuals, firms, 
and policy-makers are purely self-interested and make choices that are fully rational and use all available information. It 
rather recognizes that actual choices do not always fit within the standard model (e.g. people might care about equity) 
and that agents may employ heuristics instead of optimally using the available information” (UT, 2011). Based on this 
view point, it is important to understand the actual behavior of decision-makers, whether these are individuals, firms or 
policy-makers, for appropriate policy and management response. Despite the growing literature on behavioral economics, 
according to the researcher’s knowledge, none of the modelers in the standard theory of cooperatives has explicitly 
incorporated the behavioral aspect into their modeling framework.
4. Neoclassical Rational Choice Theory and Proposed Extension 
This section presents an explicit utility function, which is a major benchmark for the optimization problem underlying the 
neoclassical rational choice theory. It further demonstrates the existing discrepancy in problem formulation using the 
standard theory of cooperatives in relation to empirical anomalies, as mentioned by behavior economists in section 2. 
Using the behavioral economics approach, some suggestions are provided on how to improve traditional cooperative 
theory by incorporating non-pecuniary factors in the model. Most of these non-pecuniary factors are behavioral factors 
such as identity, framing, cognitive dissonance, altruism, herding behavior, conformance to social norms and fairness.
In standard neoclassical rational choice theory, an individual/ agent would have a utility depending on income 
(which is roughly a sum of pecuniary benefits) and he/ she will derive disutility from all other factors, which will result in 
the individual incurring a cost, such as effort, paying for the services or a membership fee. In the context of cooperatives,
members will join and remain loyal to the cooperative if the perceived monetary benefits are higher than the expected 
cost of joining and remaining active members of the organization. If we assume that an individual/ agent has log additive 
utility function in income, then the neoclassical utility function can be represented mathematically as follows:
……………………………………………………. (1)
Where Y is a vector of monetary benefit from participating in the activity or organization; and X is a vector of the 
activities that will decrease his/ her utility by participating in the activity. 
The actual neoclassical problem will then be for an individual/ agent to maximize his/ her utility subject to given 
constraints. This approach of problem formulation ignores behavioral factors in the analysis. Such omission may lead to 
systematic bias in the conclusions derived from this analytical framework. Depending on the nature of the influence by 
non-economic (behavioral) variables the conclusion may suffer from either downward bias or upward bias and, in some 
cases, there may be an incorrect prediction altogether.
For instance, when modeling workers’ compensation, Arkerlof and Kranton (2005) demonstrated that the identity of 
an individual has a significant moderating effect on the amount of compensation required to induce him to work at the 
optimal effort. The variability of the effort and, hence, compensation levels, depend not only on economic incentives but 
also on whether the worker identifies himself as an outsider or insider with respect to the belongingness to the 
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organization. There is also a moderating effect due to the interaction between monetary and behavioral incentives. To 
improve the neoclassical utility model, this paper adapted the Akerlof and Kranton model, which was applied in a special 
case of identity, to analyze workers’ compensation in a more general “behavioral rational utility function”. 
In what we call a generalized behavioral rational utility function, we assume that cooperative members have a log-
additive utility function in pecuniary benefit (Y) and non-pecuniary benefits (Z), which are mainly sociological and 
psychological factors. A vector of economics incentive (Y), a vector of cost variables (X), a vector of non-economic 
incentives (Z) and a category dummy (c) are incorporated within the framework of bounded rationality. Alpha is the 
parameter that captures the intensity underlying the incentives trigger within an individual (for simplicity it is normalized to 
 LH Į FDSWXUHV WKH SURSHQVLW\ RI XWLOLW\ GHULYHG IURP SHFXQLDU\ EHQHILWV DQG -Į FDSWXUHV WKH SURSHQVLW\ RI XWLOLW\
derived from sociological and psychological benefits. Beta is the parameter that captures the moderating effect between 
economic and non-economic incentives. The generalized behavioral utility function can be represented algebraically as 
follows:
………………………... (2)
Where X* is the optimal (least) cost for participating in the socio-economic activity while X is the actual cost 
LQFXUUHGE\DQ LQGLYLGXDO7KH ILUVW WHUPĮ,Q< LQHTXDWLRQFDSWXUHV WKHSHFXQLDU\EHQHILWV WKHVHFRQG WHUP-Į=
captures the non-pecuniary benefits , the third term (b(ZInY)) is the interaction term for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
benefits; the fourth term (X) represents the disutility due to the cost incurred and the last term captures the disutility by
diverging from the optimal, socially accepted norms (X*). 
The modified behavioral utility function provides a more flexible way of modeling the actual behavior of the 
stakeholders involved in cooperative organizations, at least from the normative analysis. Incorporating behavioral aspects 
into our modeling framework helps to improve the capability of the economic sciences in providing richer insights into how 
to understand the behavior of economic agents and cooperative organizations in particular. A recent study has shown 
that identification with strategic networks leads to internalization of network norms. The resulting normative frame of 
reference affects the behavior of agents through encouraging cooperatives since any normal breaking behavior will be 
accompanied by an identity cost. 
Other literature has demonstrated that the relationship between cooperatives and members is very important. 
Members’ commitment to cooperatives is what differentiates cooperatives from other organizational forms (Fulton, 1999; 
and Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). Apart from the economics incentives, other behavioral factors such as cognitive 
dissonance have been mentioned as acting as significant buffers against members’ attrition and increased loyalty 
(Lampros, 2008). Thus, the incorporation of cognitive dissonance and other behavioral factors may help management to 
understand better the reasons behind members’ attrition, compared to prediction based on the standard neoclassical 
theory.
The main challenge facing the behavioral approach in economic analysis is the fact that it has a normative bent. 
Since most of the behavioral factors are value-based and more subjective than objective, this makes empirical estimation 
and verification difficult in some instances. In addition, due to social-cultural heterogeneity and diversity in norms across 
communities, it is difficult to formulate a more unified recommendation. Many of the recommendations made using model 
2 may thus need to be context-specific.
5. Conclusion
The current economic understanding of the standard theory of cooperative organization is inclined towards neoclassical 
rational choice theory. While this theory is useful in predicting the behavior of individuals in conditions of perfect 
information and less uncertainty, empirical evidence shows that often decision-makers operate in a particularly complex 
and uncertain environment, and that the information available is far from perfect. Moreover, human beings are not 
necessarily always selfish, as would be predicted by the standard rational choice model. In addressing these limitations of 
the standard rational choice model, the behavioral rational choice utility model, which incorporates the behavioral aspect, 
has been developed. In appreciating the complexity of the decision-making environment, bounded rationality is assumed
instead of a purely rational approach. It is concluded that since the standard theory of cooperatives is based on the 
neoclassical utility theory, it needs to be modified to incorporate behavioral factors. This is likely to improve our insights
into and understanding of the behavior of cooperative organizations.
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